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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses the sensitivity of solvency stress testing results to the choice of credit risk 
variable and level of data aggregation at which the stress test is conducted. In practice, both 
choices are often determined by technical considerations, such as data availability. Using data for 
the Belgian banking system, we find that the impact of a stress test on banks' Tier 1 ratios can differ 
substantially depending on the credit risk variable and the level of data aggregation considered. If 
solvency stress tests are going to be used as a supervisory tool or to set regulatory capital 
requirements, there is a need to further harmonise their execution across institutions and 
supervisors in order to enhance comparability. This is certainly relevant in the context of the EU-
wide stress tests, where institutions often use different credit risk variables and levels of data 
aggregation to estimate the impact of the common methodology and macroeconomic scenario on 
their capital level while supervisors rely on different models to quality assure and validate banks’ 
results. More generally, there is also a need to improve the availability and quality of the data to be 
used for stress testing purposes. 
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 1. Introduction 
Following the 2007-2008 financial crisis, stress testing exercises have gained in importance as a 
tool for assessing vulnerabilities in the financial sector. At the international level, the IMF has 
developed balance sheet type solvency and liquidity stress testing tools, which are used as key 
components of its Financial Stability Assessment Program (FSAP).1 At the EU level, the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) now conducts regular solvency stress testing exercises which 
complement the supervisory authorities’ analyses with an EU-wide perspective by using a common 
stress test methodology and macroeconomic scenario. While until recently these large-scale 
assessments of EU banks' resilience primarily aimed at boosting market confidence and reducing 
uncertainties surrounding major banks' fragilities, they now strive more explicitly to inform the 
Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) of EU banks, under which decisions are made 
on appropriate capital resources and forward-looking capital plans are challenged.2  
This paper investigates the sensitivity of solvency stress testing results across different modelling 
choices and stresses the need for even more harmonisation in the execution of solvency stress 
tests if these are going to be used as a supervisory tool (e.g. for Pillar 2 decisions via the SREP) or 
to set regulatory requirements (e.g. for systemically important banks). Solvency stress tests provide 
estimates of the impact of stressed macroeconomic scenarios on banks' capital. The 
macroeconomic stress is likely to have an impact on the components of the profit and loss account 
(P&L), which through retained earnings have an impact on the capital and therefore the solvency 
position of banks’ balance sheets. Despite ongoing efforts to incorporate assessments of multiple 
types of risks and of second-round effects in stress testing frameworks, credit risk remains the main 
type of bank risk that is assessed in bank supervisory authorities' solvency stress testing 
exercises.3 As a consequence, most stress testing exercises concentrate on impairments in banks' 
loan portfolios (as opposed, for example, to securities held for trading purposes). 
In considering the impact of a stressed macroeconomic scenario on banks’ loan impairments, the 
critical question that must be addressed by those conducting the stress test is how to measure the 
impact of the stressed macroeconomic variables on credit risk associated with the loan portfolio. 
Ideally, one would want to translate shocks to macroeconomic variables into an increase in 
expected losses on the portfolio. However, there are no unanimously accepted techniques for 
making such estimates. As a result, a number of modelling decisions must be made in the course 
of a stress test. These decisions thus obviously introduce model risk into the results of stress tests 
(i.e., into the estimated impact on banks). 
This paper considers the impact of two basic modelling decisions in stress testing credit risk: (i) 
Which variable to use for measuring credit risk (e.g., non-performing loans, loan loss provisions, 
bankruptcy rates), and (ii) At what level of data aggregation to conduct the stress test (e.g., bank 
level, sectoral level, economy-wide level). While these questions may seem elementary, 
practitioners' modelling choices and practical issues such as data availability have resulted in 
                                                   
1 See Schmieder et al. (2011 and 2012). 
2 See EBA (2015) and ECB (2016). 
3 Examples of models covering several risks and/or second-round effects include Boss et al. (2006), Aikman 
et al. (2009), Alessandri et al. (2009), Gauthier et al. (2010), Bruneau et al. (2012), and ECB (2017). At the EU 
level, the EBA stress tests assess multiple risks, with credit risk typically accounting for the biggest impact.   
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 different approaches being taken, both by institutions and supervisors across jurisdictions as well 
as in the academic literature on stress testing. While considerable effort is being made to extend 
stress testing frameworks to incorporate assessments of multiple bank risks and second-round 
effects, we would argue that insufficient attention has been devoted to how the choices on the 
above questions may affect the practical implementation and results of stress tests. If stress tests 
are to be actively used in setting capital requirements, more needs to be known about the relative 
implications of differing modelling choices in the stress testing process. 
Using data for the Belgian banking system, we estimate how the choice of different credit risk 
variables and levels of data aggregation may impact the results of a credit stress test based on the 
2014 EBA adverse macroeconomic scenario. We find that both types of modelling choices are 
important, as they can result in substantial differences in the banks' stressed Tier 1 capital ratios. In 
particular, in our application, the impact on banks' total Tier 1 capital ratio varies from 0.08 of a 
percentage point (pp) to -2.93pp depending on the choice of the credit risk variable. Also the level 
of aggregation of the data used for estimating the values of the credit risk variable (e.g., data at 
borrower level, bank level, sectoral or economy level) matters: the impact of stressed bankruptcy 
rates on banks' corporate Tier 1 ratio ranges from -1.10pp when the stress test is conducted at the 
level of portfolios defined on the basis of industrial sectors to -3.86pp for a portfolio division based 
on firm size.4 Depending on the starting level of the banks' solvency position, differences in impact 
this large may be of crucial importance for the conclusion of the stress test.5 
Our findings indicate that the questions addressed in this paper may be important issues to be 
considered in performing a credit risk stress testing exercise. The implication here is that there is a 
need to further harmonise the conduct of stress tests not only across institutions but also 
supervisory authorities in order to enhance comparability. This is certainly relevant in the context of 
the EU-wide stress tests, where institutions often use different credit risk variables and levels of 
data aggregation to translate the effect of the common methodology and macroeconomic scenario, 
consequently influencing with this choice the impact that the stress test can have on their Tier 1 
capital ratio. Similarly, in order to quality assure and validate banks’ results, EU supervisory 
authorities use their own in-house stress test models, which often differ with respect to the 
definition and level of data aggregation used for the credit risk variables, thereby potentially also 
contributing to model risk.6  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. After a brief description of the general stress 
testing process, section 2 gives an overview of the credit risk variables used for stress testing 
purposes as well as the different levels of aggregation at which stress tests are being conducted. In 
section 3, we describe the data and the credit risk model that we use in our application. Section 4 
                                                   
4 The corporate Tier 1 ratio refers to the Tier 1 ratio calculated for corporate exposures only. By the term 
"corporate", we refer to firms of all sizes, including medium-sized and large firms as well as small businesses. 
5 These ranges of impacts are indeed potentially significant given that, in the 2014 EBA stress test, the 
weighted average impact of credit risk through P&L on Belgian banks’ total Tier 1 capital ratio amounted to      
-2.35pp under the adverse macroeconomic scenario. 
6 Examples of stress test models used by EU supervisory authorities can be found in Feldkircher et al. (2013) 
for Austria, ACPR (2013) for France, Pérez and Trucharte (2013) for Spain, or Burrows, Learmonth and 
McKeown (2012) for the UK. The framework used by the European Central Bank, which is now responsible for 
banking supervision in the euro area together with the national competent authorities, is described in ECB 
(2013) and ECB (2017).  
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 presents the results of our empirical assessment of how the two basic modelling choices may affect 
stress testing results. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. The modelling choices 
This section first describes the credit stress testing process.7 We then discuss the two basic 
questions which are later tested in the paper, namely how the choice of the credit risk variables and 
the level of data aggregation can affect stress testing results. 
2.1 The stress testing process 
Credit stress tests assess the impact of a stressed macroeconomic scenario on the quality of 
banks’ credit exposures. This approach essentially consists of three steps, to: (i) forecast values of 
macroeconomic variables under a given pre-specified (stressed) scenario over a given horizon, (ii) 
estimate the impact of the stressed macroeconomic variables on the banks' credit risk parameters 
(typically probability of default and loss given default) over a given horizon, and (iii) use these 
stressed credit risk parameters to evaluate the impact of the stress scenario on the banks’ earnings 
and risk exposure amounts (REA) and hence on their regulatory capital ratio.8 A distinction may be 
made between "top-down" and "bottom-up" stress tests. In their purest forms, the top-down stress 
test is one in which authorities use data at their disposal to conduct all the steps of the stress test, 
including estimating the ultimate impact on P&L and solvency positions. In a pure bottom-up stress 
test, banks estimate the stressed credit risk variables and the ultimate impact on their P&L and 
solvency.9 
The practical implementation of steps (i) and (ii) generally involves two different modelling stages. 
In step (i), a macroeconometric model is typically used for forecasting the behaviour of 
macroeconomic variables (e.g., the GDP growth rate, the unemployment rate and the long-term 
interest rate) under a pre-specified stress scenario over a given horizon. In general, adverse 
shocks to one or more macroeconomic variables are entered into the model, and the equations in 
the model determine how these and other macroeconomic variables behave over the stress testing 
horizon as a consequence of the shocks. In Step (ii), a second modelling component, the credit risk 
model, is required to estimate the impact of the stressed macroeconomic variables on the banks' 
credit risk parameters over the stress testing horizon. This component essentially consists of one 
or more equations linking the banks' credit risk parameters to the macroeconomic variables. The 
stressed macroeconomic variables obtained from the macroeconometric model are entered into 
this model to obtain stressed values of the credit risk parameters. Finally, in Step (iii), the stressed 
values of the credit risk parameters are mapped into expected losses, which in turn are entered 
                                                   
7 Descriptions of the credit stress testing process and stress testing processes in general can be found in 
Blaschke et al. (2001), Jones, Hilbers and Slack (2004), ýihák (2007), Drehmann (2009), Foglia (2009) and 
ECB (2013). 
8 The term “risk exposure amounts” has recently replaced the term “risk-weighted assets”, which had 
previously been employed in the Basel framework.  
9 In some jurisdictions, the terms "top-down" and "bottom-up" refer respectively to the aggregate and 
disaggregate nature of data inputs used by institutions or supervisory authorities rather than to who performs 
the stress test analysis. 
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 into the banks' P&L, and into changes in banks’ REA to obtain the estimated impact on their 
solvency position. 
In this paper, we focus on the second step in which the credit risk variable is linked to the 
macroeconomic variables.10 In particular, we test the impact of using different variables for 
measuring credit risk (i.e., the dependent variable of the credit risk model) and of considering 
different levels of data aggregation at which the credit risk variable is linked to the macroeconomic 
variables. 
2.2 The choice of credit risk variable 
Ultimately, the impact of the stress test has to be translated into losses for the banks. That is, the 
credit risk components of expected losses - the probability of default (PD), the loss given default 
(LGD) and the exposure at default (EAD) - have to be mapped into observable variables. While 
EAD may be observed from information on the banks' loan portfolios, PD and LGD have to be 
estimated or proxied by observable variables that relate to credit risk. In this sub-section, we 
discuss the different types of credit risk variables used in practice and raise the issue of sensitivity 
of stress testing results to the choice of different credit risk variables. This choice is often 
determined by practical considerations, such as data availability at the desired level of data 
aggregation. 
2.2.1 Credit risk variables used in practice 
Several variables have been used in credit stress testing applications. We distinguish between 
variables based on bank accounting data, default data and model-based measures, respectively. 
Bank accounting data 
A bank accounting measure that may serve as a proxy for PD is the ratio of (new) non-performing 
loans to a given measure of total loans (NPL ratio). This variable has been suggested by Blaschke 
et al. (2001), among others, and used by Jakubík and HeĜmánek (2008), Jakubík and Schmieder 
(2008), Vazquez, Tabak and Souto (2012) and Buncic and Melecky (2013). Conceptually, the NPL 
ratio may be a good proxy for PD, as non-performing loans are those loans for which the 
contractual interest or principal will likely not be collected and which are therefore technically in 
default. However, until 2014, there was no single definition of non-performing loans in the 
European Union; while non-performing loans were usually determined by a criterion such as x days 
overdue, the value of x typically differed across banks (x has now been set at 90 in the EU). 
Therefore, until recently, the NPL ratio was not entirely comparable across EU banks. 
Following an increase in expected credit loss (due to a rise in PD or LGD), banks may set aside 
new provisions and record them as impairments on the expenditure side of their P&L, with an 
ultimate impact on their Tier 1 capital through lower retained earnings. Therefore, another natural 
                                                   
10 One can distinguish models where the macroeconometric model and the credit risk model are two separate 
entries or modules in the stress testing framework and models where the link between credit risk and 
macroeconomic developments is integrated into or jointly estimated with the macroeconometric model. See 
Ferrari et al. (2011) for a discussion of the implications of these differing model structures. 
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 candidate for capturing credit risk is the ratio of (new) loan loss provisions (or impairments) to a 
given measure of the stock of total loans (LLP ratio, also referred to as the credit cost ratio). This 
credit risk variable is often used in stress testing applications (see Kalirai and Scheicher, 2002; 
Lehmann and Manz, 2006; Sorge and Virolainen, 2006; van den End, Hoeberichts and Tabbae, 
2006; Gáogowksi, 2008; and Gutiérrez Girault, 2008). Interestingly, the LLP ratio is not a pure 
measure of PD; it also entails an LGD component.11 However, accounting rules on provisioning 
generally differ across jurisdictions. In addition, changes in the LLP ratio do not necessarily reflect 
only credit risk, but may also depend on banks' provisioning policies, which may involve, for 
example, income smoothing for fiscal reasons.12 Thus, within the existing regulations, banks often 
have some discretion in recording new impairments. 
This potential lack of comparability of loan loss provisions and, until recently, non-performing loans 
across EU banks implies that it may be useful to complement bank accounting measures of credit 
risk with more direct or strictly defined measures of borrower default.  
   
Default data 
Another proxy for PD may be found in banks' databases of borrowers’ defaults; these data may be 
available at borrower level (as a 0/1 indicator of default), or at more aggregate levels expressed as 
a portfolio default rate. Studies that use default rates as the credit risk variable include Wong, Choi 
and Fong (2008), Jiménez and Mencía (2009), Simons and Rowles (2009), and Jokivuolle and 
Virén (2013). While the Basel II framework provides a uniform definition of default (an obligor being 
considered to be in default when either the bank considers that the borrowers are unlikely to meet 
their credit obligations in full or when they are more than 90 days overdue on any material credit 
obligation to the bank), it is not fully harmonised across banks. Borrowers’ default data are 
sometimes also centralised in (central banks') credit registers, to which banks typically have to 
report loan-level information for each loan contract whose size exceeds a given (relatively low) 
threshold. These data sources therefore provide wide coverage of the banks' loan portfolios. In 
contrast to bank accounting data, however, these data are usually not publicly available. 
As an alternative to default information, which is not always available in credit registers, information 
on bankruptcy filings may be used. While bankruptcy rates are likely to understate default - as 
default is not always followed by bankruptcy - they are nevertheless relatively frequently used as a 
credit risk dependent variable in stress testing because of the lack of publicly available data on 
default (see Boss, 2002; Virolainen, 2004; Misina, Tessier and Dey, 2006; Sorge and Virolainen, 
2006; van den End, Hoeberichts and Tabbae, 2006; Andersen et al., 2008; Bernhardsen and 
Syversten, 2009; and Bruneau et al., 2012). In contrast to default data, information on bankruptcy 
filings is usually publicly available. However, bankruptcy data usually only apply to firms; therefore, 
they cannot provide an estimate of default rates for loans to households, for example. 
 
                                                   
11 In fact, van den End, Hoeberichts and Tabbae (2006) exploit this feature of the LLP ratio to separately 
identify the behaviour of LGD in addition to that of PD by combining data on the LLP ratio with bankruptcy rate 
data. 
12 See e.g., Foglia (2009). 
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 Model-based measures 
A final category of measures used as credit risk variables in stress testing consists of model-based 
measures. Rather than directly conducting the analysis on the basis of observed credit risk 
variables, these studies typically employ a combination of market information, such as stock 
returns or CDS spreads, and a (structural) portfolio credit risk model to generate estimates of 
banks' credit losses under adverse scenarios. 
When market information is used to derive the credit risk variable, two possible approaches can be 
followed to link the credit risk variable to the macroeconomic variables. One approach is to first 
estimate the credit risk component of the market price, using macroeconomic variables as 
explanatory variables, and then to evaluate the credit risk component using stressed values of the 
macroeconomic variables (see Åsberg and Shanazarian, 2008; and Castrén, Dées and Zaher, 
2010 using Moody's KMV EDFs that are extracted from stock market data using a Merton-type 
approach). An alternative approach, as followed by Drehmann (2005) and Pesaran et al. (2006), is 
to first estimate the relationship between the market data and the macroeconomic variables, to 
evaluate market prices at stressed values of the macroeconomic variables, and then to extract the 
credit risk variable from the stressed market price data.13 The advantage of the market-based 
indicators is that they can be constructed on the basis of borrower-level data that are publicly 
available. However, the coverage of banks' loan portfolios that can be obtained in this approach 
may be limited, since market data are only available for publicly listed firms and are typically not 
available for SMEs and households, which may represent a large proportion of the banks' loan 
portfolios. Finally, movements in market prices are not necessarily related to credit risk; market 
price changes are also likely to reflect other factors that may be unrelated to credit risk, such as 
market liquidity, investors' risk aversion or general market sentiment.14 
As an alternative to market-based credit risk information, one may consider using banks' model-
based internally estimated PDs, which are assigned to each loan in a portfolio. In the Basel 
framework’s internal ratings-based (IRB) approach, these estimated default probabilities are used 
for computing risk exposure amounts in order to determine the bank's regulatory capital 
requirement. As banks' internally estimated PDs are usually not publicly available, these data are 
rarely used in stress testing exercises (a notable exception is Düllmann and Kick, 2014). In 
addition, some authorities have found that different banks sometimes assign quite different PDs to 
the same firms (Gustin and Van Roy, 2014). Another disadvantage of banks' internally estimated 
default probabilities, besides their limited availability, is the fact that these PDs may often be  
"through-the-cycle", meaning that the PD for a borrower may be estimated as an average value 
over an entire economic cycle.  
 
 
                                                   
13 An interesting but unanswered question is how big the difference is between the stressed values of the 
credit risk variables, and hence, the results of the stress test, from these two approaches. 
14 This is not only true for stock prices, which in general may be expected to depend on all factors that affect 
the firm's future profitability, but also for credit default swaps (see Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Bongaerts et 
al., 2011; and Annaert et al., 2013). 
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 2.2.2 Sensitivity of stress testing results across different credit risk variables 
As no ideal measure of credit risk seems to exist, practitioners often have to choose among 
different potential credit risk variables, and the ultimate choice may to a large extent be driven by 
practical considerations, such as data availability. It is therefore important to assess the sensitivity 
of stress testing results to the choice of credit risk variable. 
Speed and extent of credit risk information incorporation 
A general feature of the different credit risk variables that may affect the sensitivity of stress test 
results to the choice of credit risk variable is the speed at which and the extent to which credit risk 
information is reflected in the credit risk variable. In particular, one issue that has received some 
attention in stress testing is the backward- or forward-looking nature of the data. On the one hand, 
event-based data, such as non-performing loans, and default and bankruptcy data, are typically 
backward-looking, in that they include information only on past events. Moreover, the speed at 
which the evolution of credit risk is reflected in these event-based variables depends on the 
underlying definitions of the event, which may differ across the different variables (e.g., the number 
of days overdue for non-performing loans and default data, the time between actual distress and 
the bankruptcy filing in the case of bankruptcy rates). Credit risk variables based on loan loss 
provisions may, in principle, also be considered to be backward-looking, but the extent to which this 
is the case may depend on the bank's provisioning policy. 
Model-based credit risk variables, such as those based on market information or banks' internally 
estimated PDs, are said to be forward-looking or ex-ante measures of credit risk. Model-based PDs 
(if based on the Basel II concept) typically reflect the probability (or expectation) of default over a 
future one-year horizon. Important in this respect is the potential through-the-cycle nature of the 
model-based credit risk variables. To the extent that they are indeed through-the-cycle, as opposed 
to "point-in-time", this may hamper the finding of any statistically significant relationship of the credit 
risk variable with macroeconomic movements.15 
These features of the various credit risk variables may imply different (timing in the) reactions of 
specific credit risk variables to stressed macroeconomic variables and hence, potentially different 
stress testing results. 
Stocks versus flows 
Not only using inherently different types of credit risk variables, but also the use of different variants 
or transformations of particular credit risk variables may raise sensitivity issues regarding stress 
testing results. For instance, it has been suggested by Pain (2003), Jakubík and HeĜmánek (2008), 
and Jakubík and Schmieder (2008), for example, to use flows of new loan loss provisions and non-
performing loans, respectively, since write-offs and reversals may blur the picture of developments 
in credit risk obtained from looking at the outstanding stocks of these accounting variables (e.g., 
large write-offs may result in a decrease in the stock of LLPs and NPLs, even when the flow of new 
                                                   
15 Sorge and Virolainen (2006) observe that while accounting measures of risk are very sensitive to the 
business cycle, market-based indicators exhibit substantial variability both across firms and over time, but 
appear to be less responsive to macroeconomic or systematic risk factors. 
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 provisions and non-performing loans has increased).16 To the extent that an LLP or NPL ratio 
constructed from the stock of LLPs or NPLs, respectively, reacts differently to the macroeconomic 
variables than an LLP or NPL ratio based on the flow of new provisions or non-performing loans, 
respectively, the use of these different variants or transformations of these credit risk variables may 
introduce sources of divergence in stress testing results. 
2.3 The choice of the level of data aggregation 
Stress tests can be conducted at several levels of aggregation, implying different levels of 
aggregation at which the credit risk variable can be linked to the macroeconomic variables. This 
section considers the different levels of data aggregation at which credit risk variables can be 
linked to the macroeconomic environment.17 Like the choice of the credit risk variable, the choice 
of the level of data aggregation at which the credit risk variable is linked to the macroeconomic 
variables is often determined by practical considerations, such as data availability. Again, this may 
raise the question of how sensitive stress testing results are when the link between the credit risk 
variable and the macroeconomic variables is estimated at different levels of data aggregation. 
2.3.1 The levels of data aggregation used in practice 
Several levels of data aggregation have been used in stress testing applications. In our discussion, 
we focus on four possible levels of aggregation: the borrower level, the bank level, the sectoral 
level and the economy-wide level. 
Borrower level data 
The approach using the data at the most granular level in linking the credit risk variable to 
macroeconomic developments can be obtained using borrower-level data (e.g., estimating a firm's 
or household's default probability). Examples of credit stress testing applications using borrower-
level data include Drehman (2005), Pesaran et al. (2006), Andersen et al. (2008), Bernhardsen and 
Syversten (2009), Bruneau et al. (2012), and Düllmann and Kick (2014). The use of borrower-level 
data allows the sensitivity of the credit risk variable to macroeconomic variables to differ across 
firms or households.18 In doing so, differences in the potential reactions of borrowers to adverse 
macroeconomic shocks may be revealed and a more detailed picture of the effect of 
macroeconomic stress on a bank’s portfolio may be obtained. However, in order to fully exploit the 
informational advantage obtained by using borrower-level data, the practitioner conducting the 
                                                   
16 Write-offs imply the removal of a loan from the balance sheet when the loan is considered completely 
unrecoverable. Reversals occur on impairments that have previously been recognised in the accounts and 
follow events that suggest an increase in the recoverable amount of the asset (e.g., an improvement of the 
borrower's ability to pay). Reversals are recognised as a credit to the P&L. 
17 This need not coincide with the level of aggregation - e.g., portfolio, bank or system-wide level - at which 
the resilience assessment in terms of losses or capital adequacy is performed. 
18 In addition, borrower-specific characteristics (e.g., firm size or firm accounting variables, household income) 
can be controlled for in order to improve the predictive power of the credit risk model. A large literature exists 
on predicting borrowers' default/bankruptcy using micro and macro variables (see Jacobson et al., 2009 and 
the references therein). Among the models in this literature, which may be used for stress testing as well, 
interesting applications on bank regulatory issues include Saurina and Trucharte (2007) on Basel II pro-
cyclicality in mortgage portfolios, and Chionsini, Marcucci and Quagliariello (2010) on the treatment of small 
and medium enterprises in Basel II. 
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 stress test should have knowledge of (or make assumptions about) the exact composition of the 
banks' portfolios. This may be problematic for top-down stress tests. Even in a bottom-up stress 
test, the borrower-level approach may not be feasible, in that evaluating the sensitivity of the credit 
risk of every individual borrower to macroeconomic stress may require substantial IT resources.  
Bank level data 
When data on the credit risk of individual borrowers and/or information on the banks' portfolio 
composition are not available, an alternative may be to use credit risk information aggregated at 
the level of the different banks (bank-level data, such as non-performing loans or impairments). 
Applications in the stress testing literature include Lehmann and Manz (2006), Gutiérrez Girault 
(2008), Gáogowksi (2008), and Buncic and Melecky (2013). While linking the credit risk variable to 
the macroeconomic environment at this level of aggregation does not make it possible to 
differentiate between the effects of macroeconomic stress on the different individual firms or the 
different loan portfolios of the bank, it does allow for distinguishing the effects of macroeconomic 
stress across banks. 
Sectoral data 
Alternatively, sectoral credit risk data may be used for stress testing (see e.g., Virolainen, 2004; 
Sorge and Virolainen, 2006; Misina, Tessier and Dey, 2006; Jakubík and HeĜmánek, 2008; Jakubík 
and Schmieder, 2008; Wong, Choi and Fong, 2008; Jiménez and Mencía, 2009; Simons and 
Rolwes, 2009; Castrén, Dées and Zaher, 2010; Breuer et al., 2012; and Düllmann and Kick, 2014). 
In a narrow sense, sectors may refer to different corporate or industrial sectors as well as to the 
more general distinction between for example the corporate sector and the household sector. More 
broadly, a breakdown of the credit risk of exposures by for example geographical location or firm 
size may also be considered to be "sectoral" data. The sectoral approach enables heterogeneous 
treatment of banks in terms of sensitivity to macroeconomic stress, provided that information is 
available on the banks' exposures to different sectors. Obviously, it may also be possible to 
combine the sectoral approach with the previous level of aggregation, i.e., to obtain sectoral credit 
risk data at the level of the different banks (bank-sector observations, see Segoviano and Padilla, 
2006; and Vazquez, Tabak and Souto, 2012, for example).19 
Economy-wide data 
The final level of aggregation is economy-wide. The advantage of such an aggregate approach is 
that economy-wide data are generally more readily available than more granular data. Applications 
are therefore ubiquitous, including Boss (2002), Kalirai and Schleicher (2002), Sorge and 
Virolainen (2006), van den End, Hoeberichts and Tabbae (2006), Åsberg and Shahnazarian 
(2008), Wong, Choi and Fong (2008), Simons and Rolwes (2009), Castrén, Dées and Zaher (2010) 
and Buncic and Melecky (2013). Modelling the aggregate behaviour of borrowers is also potentially 
                                                   
19 Similarly, combining information on different "sectors", e.g., model-based probabilities of default of different 
industrial sectors for different geographical locations is also an option. 
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 less complex and more robust than the individual borrower approach.20 Nevertheless, aggregate 
data potentially ignore significant variations across borrowers, sectors or banks that would be 
captured in a more granular approach. 
2.3.2 Sensitivity of stress testing results across different levels of data aggregation 
To perform stress testing, ideally we link the credit risk of each separate borrower in the banks' 
portfolios to the macroeconomic environment; the more granular the data level, the more 
differentiation in relationships between the credit risk variable and the macroeconomic environment 
can be taken into account in evaluating the effect of macroeconomic stress on the banks' solvency 
positions. For several practical reasons, such as the lack of granular credit risk data or information 
of the composition of banks' balance sheets, this may not be feasible and the credit risk variable 
must be linked to macroeconomic variables at a more aggregate level. The more aggregate 
approaches are obviously more efficient in both data and modelling resources.  
However, an important question is whether stress testing results are sensitive to different choices 
of the level of data aggregation. As stated by Foglia (2009), analyses using econometric models 
based on aggregate data may conceal significant variation at the borrower, sector or bank level. To 
our knowledge, Vazquez, Tabak and Souto (2012) and Düllmann and Kick (2014) are the only 
studies that compare results of a credit stress test based on granular data to those obtained for 
more aggregate data.21 More specifically, Vazquez, Tabak and Souto (2012) simulate the evolution 
of bank-level NPLs with and without exploiting a partition of credit portfolios by borrower types (i.e. 
consumer vs. corporates) and economic sectors. They find the presence of a data aggregation bias 
stemming from inadequate granularity in the credit portfolios which are subject to macro shocks; in 
particular, the bank-weighted average of the simulated NPLs using less granular portfolios is 
always lower than the simulated NPLs under the more granular portfolios. Similarly, Düllmann and 
Kick (2014) find a substantial information gain in using borrower-specific PDs instead of sector-
level PD; higher dispersion in the relative increase in expected losses under the stress scenario 
found when using borrower-specific PDs illustrates that the use of more granular information allows 
a better differentiation between banks concerning the impact of different scenarios.    
2.4 Summary 
Different credit risk variables may react differently to stressed macroeconomic variables, potentially 
resulting in a sensitivity of stress testing results to the choice of different credit risk variables. In 
addition, not only using inherently different types of credit risk variables, but also the use of 
different variants or transformations of particular credit risk variables may raise robustness issues 
regarding stress testing results. Finally, the level of data aggregation at which the stress test is 
conducted may also result in diverging stress testing results when significant variation exists in the 
sensitivity to the macroeconomic environment across borrowers, sectors or banks. 
                                                   
20 Jacobson et al. (2008) compare the results of several models forecasting firms' default and find that models 
estimated on aggregate data exhibit a much higher parameter stability than those estimated at the borrower-
level. 
21 Cerutti and Schmieder (2014) show that the outcome of a stress test is also affected by the level of 
consolidation of the balance sheet used in the exercise.   
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 In the remainder of this paper, we empirically investigate these issues by estimating how the choice 
of different credit risk variables and levels of data aggregation in the credit model may impact credit 
stress testing results using data for the Belgian banking system. 
 
3. Empirical approach  
This section describes the empirical approach for evaluating the sensitivity of stress testing results 
across different credit risk variables and levels of data aggregation. We then present the variables 
used to estimate the credit risk model and perform the stress test. 
3.1 Modelling approach 
The empirical approach we follow in order to illustrate the importance of the choice of the credit risk 
variables and levels of data aggregation for stress testing results consists of five steps: (i) estimate 
a credit risk model in which a given credit risk variable at a given level of data aggregation is linked 
to the macroeconomic variables, (ii) based on this estimated credit risk model, simulate the 
distribution of the credit risk variable over a given stress testing horizon, conditional on a given 
evolution of the macroeconomic variables, (iii) use information on LGD and EAD to transform the 
simulated credit risk variable distribution into a simulated expected loss distribution at each time 
period in the stress testing horizon, (iv) for a given percentile of the simulated expected loss 
distribution, take the average level of the simulated expected loss over the stress testing horizon, 
and (v) subtract from this average level the expected loss of the last period before the stress 
testing horizon and express this difference in terms of impact on the Tier 1 capital ratio. The 
sensitivity of stress testing results to the choice of different credit risk variables and different levels 
of aggregation can then be assessed by comparing the simulated impacts on the banks' solvency 
positions across different credit risk variables and levels of data aggregation. 
In our application, we perform step (i) by estimating the following linear equation: 
ܥ௧ =ן + ෍ߚ௧ି௝௟
௝ୀଵ
ܥ௧ି௝ +෍෍ߛ௜,௧ି௝௟
௝ୀ଴
ܯ௜,௧ି௝௠
௜ୀଵ
+ ߝ௧ (1) 
where ܥ௧ denotes the value of the credit risk variable at time ݐ, ܯ௜,௧ the value of macroeconomic 
variable ݅ at time ݐ, ݉ is the number of macroeconomic variables included in the model, ݈ is the 
number of lags of the independent variables and ߝ௧ is the value of the error term at time ݐ.22 This 
type of autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) credit risk model is frequently used by the IMF in its 
FSAP (see e.g. IMF, 2011, where it is used to forecast the LLP ratio) and by many central banks as 
part of their top-down stress test framework (see e.g. ECB, 2013 and 2017). Several academic 
papers have also used it for forecasting credit risk variables (see Virolainen, 2004, for the 
bankruptcy rate or Buncic and Melecky, 2013, for the NPL ratio).   
In step (ii) we take 100,000 random draws of ߝ௧ from the normal distribution for each period in the 
stress testing horizon. On the basis of the estimated equation (1) and changes in the 
                                                   
22 Within this framework, one could also have assumed that the macroeconomic variables follow a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) system.  
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 macroeconomic variables over the stress testing horizon, this results in 100,000 predictions of ܥ௧ 
for each period in this horizon23. Hence, for each period in the stress testing horizon, a distribution 
for the simulated credit risk variable conditional on movements in the macroeconomic variables is 
obtained. Using information on LGD and EAD, simulated conditional expected loss distributions are 
consequently calculated in step (iii) on the basis of the formula EL=PD*LGD*EAD. 
The advantage of working with expected loss distributions rather than a point estimate for expected 
losses in each time period over the stress testing horizon is that a distribution enables us to not 
only look at the mean predicted expected loss but also at higher percentiles of the distribution, 
which is useful to account for the presence of model uncertainty in the equations linking the credit 
risk variables and the macroeconomic variables.24 Therefore, in step (iv), we consider both the 
50th percentile and the 75th percentile of the simulated expected loss distributions. This enables 
an assessment of the sensitivity to modelling choices of the stress testing results for not just the 
median of simulated expected losses distributions in each period, but also for more severe 
predictions of simulated expected losses.  
Finally, in step (v), we take the difference between the stressed expected loss level obtained in 
step (iv) for a given percentile ݌ of the expected loss distribution and the expected loss of the last 
period before the stress testing horizon, resulting in an average change in the level of expected 
losses over the stress testing horizon compared to the level in normal times for the given percentile 
݌ of the expected loss distribution. Assuming that this change in the level of expected losses is 
entirely deducted from Tier 1 capital, the average change is expressed in terms of impact on the 
Tier 1 capital ratio as follows: 
ܶ݅݁ݎ1݅݉݌ܽܿݐ(݌) = οܧܮ(݌)
ܴܧܣ
 (2) 
  
where οܧܮ(݌) denotes the average change in expected losses for the given percentile ݌ of the 
expected loss distribution and ܴܧܣ are risk exposure amounts.25 
3.2 Data 
In our stress testing application, we use quarterly data for the Belgian banking system on the 
different credit risk variables and macroeconomic variables. The estimation of the credit risk model 
is performed over the sample 1995Q1-2013Q4 and the stress testing horizon spans the period 
2014Q1-2016Q4. In the following sub-sections, we present these data in more detail. For a 
description of each of the variables used in the credit risk model, see Table A1 in the appendix. 
                                                   
23 The model is solved with stochastic mean and confidence bounds. 
24 Model uncertainty refers here to the fact that there is a risk that the chosen credit risk model 
underestimates the risk parameter response and as a consequence overestimates the loss absorption 
capacity of the banks, even if its results may be sound and look acceptable from an economic and 
econometric viewpoint. The use of a higher percentile or of alternative stress testing techniques, such as the 
Bayesian model averaging methodology promoted by Gross and Población (2015), may help to mitigate that 
risk. In this paper, the choice of the 75th percentile is arbitrary (the selection of higher percentiles would make 
no difference to our main message).        
25 Due to a lack of data on banks’ internal credit risk models, we abstain from simulating the increase in risk 
exposure amounts induced by the change in the credit risk variables. The sensitivity of Belgian banks’ REA to 
changes in credit risk can be found in the published results of the 2014 EBA stress test.   
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 3.2.1 The credit risk variables 
In our analysis, we consider two sets of credit risk variables: one for assessing the sensitivity of 
stress testing results to the choice of the credit risk variable, and one for the choice of the level of 
data aggregation. 
The choice of credit risk variable 
As discussed in Section 2.2, three categories of credit risk variables have been used in the stress 
testing literature: bank accounting data, default data and model-based measures. In our 
application, we assess the sensitivity of stress testing results across four variables measuring the 
credit risk of Belgian banks. The first three belong to the category of bank accounting data and the 
last one to the category of default data. In particular, we consider the stock of non-performing loans 
as a percentage of total loans (NPL ratio) of Belgian banks, the stock of loan loss provisions as a 
percentage of total loans (LLP ratio) of Belgian banks, the flow of loan loss provisions as a 
percentage of total loans (FLLP ratio) of Belgian banks, and the bankruptcy rate among Belgian 
firms (BR). The NPL, LLP and FLLP ratios were obtained from data in the FINREP supervisory 
reporting scheme while the bankruptcy rate was obtained from data on bankruptcy filings and the 
NBB's central corporate credit register. Each of these data sources is confidential.  
While credit risk variables are available at the bank level, we nevertheless perform our analysis for 
a representative bank by aggregating information from individual banks incorporated under Belgian 
law (i.e. solo data). While working at the aggregate instead of individual bank level is essentially for 
simplicity and illustrative purposes, it has the additional benefit of smoothing the series for the NPL, 
LLP and FLLP ratios. As the Belgian accounting and regulatory framework provides flexibility to 
banks in the way they recognise their loan losses (see Arbak, 2016), there is room for considerable 
bank-specific variability. Thus, our choice of working with aggregate data also allows us to discount 
this source of variability and focus only on the variability that may be driven by choice of credit risk 
variable and the level of data aggregation.  
It is worth mentioning that while the NPL, LLP and FLLP ratios capture the credit risk of loans to all 
types of counterparties irrespective of their geographical location (domestic and foreign), 
bankruptcy rates only reflect the credit risk originating from loans to Belgian firms. Even though this 
difference in scope of coverage is mitigated by the fact that we work with solo data, it may, together 
with the reasons mentioned in the previous sections, translate into differences in expected losses 
once the different credit risk variables are stressed, depending on how each variable evolves over 
time and is linked to macroeconomic fluctuations.  
Figure 1 shows that the four credit risk variables follow a relatively similar pattern over the sample 
period 1995Q1-2013Q4, i.e. a decrease prior to the 2007-2008 financial crisis followed by an 
increase afterwards. Regarding the level of the variables, the values of the flow variables (FLLP 
ratio and BR) are below those of the stock variables (NPL and LLP ratios) because they only 
account for new (annualised) provisions and bankruptcies in a given quarter. In addition, the 
bankruptcy rate is somewhat higher than the FLLP ratio because the credit risk originating from 
loans to Belgian firms has been traditionally higher than the credit risk of loans to all types of 
counterparties, irrespective of their geographical location.   
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 FIGURE 1. Trend in credit risk variables, 1995Q1-2013Q4 (all variables in %). 
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Note: (1) The NPL and LLP ratios are stock variables; the quarterly observations correspond to yearly credit 
risk parameters. The FLLP ratio and BR, on the other hand, are flow variables. That is, they represent the new 
impairments and bankruptcy filings, respectively, recorded every quarter. Therefore, the FLLP and BR series 
in Figure 1 and the subsequent analysis are annualised (sum over the last four quarters). (2) The two 
variables based on loan loss provisions entail an LGD component, whereas BR and the NPL ratio are proxies 
for PD only. Therefore, the values of the LLP and FLLP ratios are divided by an assumed LGD of 0.45 in order 
to serve as a proxy for PD (in practice, LGD values differ e.g. across types of loans and vary over time). All 
variables are seasonally adjusted. In a few cases, we have corrected for outliers as further data investigation 
showed that they were purely driven by idiosyncratic factors. 
 
The similar pattern of the different variables over the sample period is confirmed in Table 1, which 
indicates that the four variables are highly correlated. This is not only true for the mutual 
relationships among the different bank accounting data, but also, and despite their different 
coverage, for the relationship between the bankruptcy rate and the different accounting variables. 
TABLE 1. Correlation among different credit risk variables, 1995Q1-2013Q4. 
 BR FLLP ratio LLP ratio NPL ratio 
BR 1.00    
FLLP ratio 0.56 1.00   
LLP ratio 0.76 0.70 1.00  
NPL ratio 0.77 0.72 0.95 1.00 
 
The choice of level of data aggregation 
Besides the choice of credit risk variable, we have explained in Section 2.3 that the level at which 
credit risk is aggregated and linked to the macroeconomic variables is an additional important 
modelling decision to be made by the stress test practitioner. To test the extent to which stress 
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 testing results may vary across different levels of aggregation, we use the data on bankruptcy rates 
and compare the results obtained at the economy-wide data level with those obtained from using a 
credit risk model based on a lower level of data aggregation (sectoral). In particular, we consider 
the four following "sectors": small manufacturing firms, large and medium-sized manufacturing 
firms, small non-manufacturing firms, and large and medium-sized non-manufacturing firms. Just 
before the start of the stress test simulation period (2013Q4), these four sectors accounted 
respectively for 6%, 1%, 88%, and 5% of the total population of Belgian firms.26 In addition, we 
also consider two intermediate levels of data aggregation: manufacturing versus non-
manufacturing firms (industrial sectors), and large and medium-sized firms versus small firms (firm 
size).  
Figure 2 shows the trend in the (annualised) quarterly bankruptcy rate at the economy-wide level 
and across the different levels of data aggregation by sector and firm size. Table 2 below reports 
the correlations among these variables. 
FIGURE 2. Trend in the bankruptcy rate for different levels of data aggregation, 1995Q1-
2013Q4 (in %). 
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26 Each firm is classified in either the manufacturing or non-manufacturing sector according to its NACE code 
and in each size category according to its total sales and total assets. While manufacturing firms represent 
less than 10% of the total number of firms, they are usually larger in size than non-manufacturing firms. 
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 TABLE 2. Correlation among bankruptcy rates for different levels of data aggregation, 
1995Q1-2013Q4. 
  
economy-
wide manuf. 
non-
manuf. 
medium/ 
large small 
medium/ 
large 
manuf. 
small 
manuf. 
medium/ 
large 
non-
manuf. 
small 
non-
manuf. 
economy-
wide 1.00         
manuf. 0.79 1.00        
non-manuf. 0.99 0.74 1.00       
medium/ 
large 0.77 0.61 0.76 1.00      
small 0.99 0.79 0.99 0.72 1.00     
medium/ 
large manuf. 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.70 0.41 1.00    
small 
manuf. 0.74 0.96 0.69 0.47 0.75 0.19 1.00   
medium/ 
large non-
manuf. 
0.78 0.59 0.78 0.96 0.73 0.49 0.51 1.00  
small non-
manuf. 0.99 0.73 0.99 0.72 0.99 0.42 0.69 0.73 1.00 
 
Both the figure and the table reflect the sectoral composition of the Belgian firms: the economy-
wide pattern of bankruptcy rates closely follows that for small non-manufacturing firms, which 
represent almost 90% of the sample. The correlation between bankruptcy rates at the economy-
wide level and bankruptcy rates of large and medium-sized manufacturing firms is markedly lower. 
Therefore, when linking the economy-wide bankruptcy rate to the macroeconomic variables, it is 
mainly the sensitivity of small non-manufacturing firms to the macroeconomic environment that is 
reflected in the estimates. This may have a strong impact on stress testing results when large 
manufacturing firms behave quite differently over the cycle and banks have substantial exposures 
to the latter. 
3.2.2 Macroeconomic variables and the macroeconomic stress scenario 
Finally, we briefly discuss the three macroeconomic variables that we use in our application: 
Belgium's business survey indicator (as a proxy for GDP growth),27 Belgium's unemployment rate 
(to cover the income and demand channel) and the 10-year yield on Belgian government bonds, 
the so-called OLO rate (to cover debt servicing costs). Figure 3 shows the actual change in these 
three variables over the period 1995Q1-2013Q4 as well as their trend under the adverse 
macroeconomic scenario of the 2014 EBA stress test (as indicated by the grey shaded area). It is 
                                                   
27 The business survey indicator, which is compiled on the basis of the responses to the business survey 
which the NBB conducts each month among firms in Belgium, captures cyclical movements in economic 
activity. It is highly correlated with GDP growth while offering a broader view of economic trends and 
comprising information on variables such as expectations (see De Greef and Van Nieuwenhuyze, 2009). 
Notwithstanding the strong correlation, the significance of the business survey indicator is higher than that of 
GDP growth in our credit risk model estimations. Therefore it is used as a proxy for GDP growth in this paper. 
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 immediately apparent that there is quite some variation in the macroeconomic variables, which was 
to be expected given that we cover more than a complete economic cycle. 
FIGURE 3. Trend in macroeconomic variables, 1995Q1-2016Q4 
(all variables in % except the business survey indicator, in points). 
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While the actual change in macroeconomic variables over 1995Q1-2013Q4 (available from 
NBB.Stat) is used in the credit risk model estimation, data over the period 2014Q1-2016Q4 
obtained from the 2014 EBA stress test’s adverse macroeconomic scenario (see ESRB, 2014) are 
considered in our stress testing application. Consistent with the overall narrative of the 2014 EBA 
adverse macroeconomic scenario, the business survey indicator falls before partly recovering, the 
unemployment rate is rising and long-term interest rates are going up before flattening out in 
Belgium over the period 2014Q1-2016Q4.  
 
4. Results 
As explained in the previous section, we first estimate equation (1) for the different credit risk 
variables using quarterly data over the sample period 1995Q1-2013Q4. For each credit risk 
variable, we then use the estimated credit risk model to simulate the stressed distribution of the 
selected credit risk variable over the stress testing horizon, using changes in the macroeconomic 
variables under the 2014 EBA adverse scenario over the stress testing horizon 2014Q1-2016Q4 as 
the stress scenario.28 We then compute the average expected loss over the stress testing horizon 
on the basis of the average value of the credit risk variable over this period at the 50th and 75th 
                                                   
28 In order to ensure the reliability of the starting values for risk parameters in the stress test, we consider the 
average of each credit risk variable over the four quarters of 2013 as the starting point for our simulations. 
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 percentile of the simulated stressed credit risk distributions, respectively. This stressed expected 
loss figure is finally expressed in terms of the impact on the Tier 1 capital ratio. 
Given that our results are dependent on the specific macroeconomic scenario chosen, they should 
only be interpreted as an illustration of the potential importance of modelling decisions in stress 
testing applications. 
4.1 Estimation results of the credit risk models 
Before turning to the results on the sensitivity of the stress testing results to the choice of different 
credit risk variables and levels of data aggregation, we first discuss the estimation results of the 
ADL model (equation (1) in Section 3.1). Following the results of a unit root test (not reported here), 
all dependent (except the FLLP ratio in Table 3) and independent (except the business survey 
indicator) variables are taken in first differences to make them stationary.29 
For each credit risk variable, we test several specifications of the model to select the number of 
lags for the independent variables. Given the limited number of observations in our time series, we 
need to trade off the loss in terms of degrees of freedom by adding more lags to increase the 
significance. While the best specification for equation (1) on the basis of model fit criteria may differ 
across the credit risk variables and levels of data aggregation, respectively, for reasons of 
comparability we estimate the same model for each of the credit risk variables and each level of 
data aggregation, respectively. In addition, within each regression, for simplicity, we impose the 
same number of lags for each independent variable. According to the Schwarz Information 
Criterion, including one lag of each independent variable in equation (1) most frequently turns out 
to be the preferred specification, both across the different credit risk variables and the levels of data 
aggregation. We therefore use this specification to estimate the credit risk model over the period 
1995Q1-2013Q4 and to perform a stress testing exercise for the period 2014Q1-2016Q4.  
The results of this specification of the credit risk model are shown in Table 3 for the different credit 
risk variables. Overall, the business survey indicator emerges as a statistically significant and 
consistent predictor of all four credit risk variables. Adding up its contemporaneous and lagged 
effects, we find that, all other things being equal, an improvement in the business survey indicator 
decreases the NPL ratio, the LLP ratio, the FLLP ratio and the bankruptcy rate, as we would 
expect. This result is also in line with the literature referred to in Section 3.1, which finds a negative 
association between GDP growth (for which the business survey indicator used in this paper 
serves as a leading indicator) and different credit risk variables. Other macroeconomic variables 
shown in Table 3 have generally a lower statistical significance. We nevertheless find that the OLO 
rate has some statistically significant impact on the FLLP ratio and BR, but in opposite ways: 
whereas a decrease in the OLO rate decreases BR, it increases the FLLP ratio. One possible 
explanation for the latter result may be that, especially since the 2007/2008 financial crisis, lower 
long-term interest rates have become associated with lower economic growth, and thus higher 
flows of loan loss provisions. Given the high percentage of long-term fixed loans on their balance 
                                                   
29 Even though the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for most series, we also estimated 
equation (1) in levels as a robustness check. The significance level of all explanatory variables remained 
unchanged. We also experimented with year-on-year (instead of quarter-on quarter) changes. Here again the 
results did not change.      
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 sheets, Belgian banks are more likely to be sensitive to changes in the economic cycle than to 
changes in interest rates per se. Finally, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in Table 3 
shows some interesting findings with respect to the persistence effect of the different credit risk 
variables as it is more significant for the (annualised) flow variables (FLLP ratio and BR) than for 
the stock variables (NPL and LLP ratios). 
TABLE 3. Results of the credit risk models: different credit risk variables. 
 NPL ratio LLP ratio FLLP ratio BR 
Credit risk var. (t-1) 0.154 (0.122) -0.161 (0.127) 0.577*** (0.086) -0.546*** (0.100) 
Bus. surv. indic. (t) -0.015*** (0.005) -0.009*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) 
Bus. surv. indic. (t-1) 0.009** (0.004) 0.006*** (0.002) -0.002** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) 
UNEMP (t) -0.053 (0.056) 0.003 (0.028) -0.006 (0.010) 0.013 (0.009) 
UNEMP (t-1) 0.028 (0.056) 0.031 (0.028) -0.010 (0.010) -0.004 (0.009) 
OLO (t) 0.009 (0.067) 0.008 (0.034) -0.028** (0.012) 0.019* (0.011) 
OLO (t-1) 0.016 (0.065) 0.032 (0.032) -0.024** (0.012) -0.001 (0.011) 
Constant -0.035 (0.023) -0.012 (0.011) 0.040*** (0.010) -0.003 (0.004) 
Observations 74 74 74 74 
Adjusted R-squared 0.16 0.13 0.55 0.37 
Sample period: 1995Q1-2013Q4. All variables in first differences except the FLLP ratio and the business 
survey indicator. *** denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes 
significance at the 10% level. Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
The results for the different levels of data aggregation in Table 4 show that all three 
macroeconomic variables have a (marginally) significant impact on the bankruptcy rate of the small 
non-manufacturing sector, which accounts for almost 90% of the total number of Belgian firms. For 
other sectors, macroeconomic variables display a lower level of significance with the exception of 
the business survey indicator for large and medium-sized non-manufacturing firms. Again, an 
interesting variation in persistence effects is observed: whereas bankruptcy rates in the 
manufacturing sector exhibit positive persistence effects, those in the non-manufacturing sector 
have negative persistence, which dominates at the aggregate level. 
 
Interestingly, other contributions in the field of stress testing which rely on an ADL framework also 
find a strong persistence of the credit risk variables. This is the case for instance in IMF (2011), 
where an ADL model is applied to the LLP ratio of a sample of small and medium-sized German 
banks, and in Buncic and Melecky (2013), where a model of this kind is used to forecast the NPL 
ratio in a panel of 54 countries. In order to check that the persistence effect does not take over 
some of the explanatory power of other explanatory variables, we first removed the lagged credit 
risk variable from our credit risk model following a suggestion made by the IMF (2015). However, 
we found the statistical significance of the macroeconomic explanatory variables to be unchanged 
across the different credit risk variables and levels of data aggregation.  Second, and while a credit 
risk model including one lag of each independent variable often turned out to be the preferred 
specification according to the Schwarz Information Criterion, we added different numbers of lags to 
each credit risk variable. Here again, the level of significance of the macroeconomic variables 
barely changed (see also Section 4.3 for a discussion of the impact of this sensitivity check on our 
main result).    
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 TABLE 4. Results of the bankruptcy rate (BR) model: different levels of data aggregation. 
 economy-wide small manuf. 
medium/large 
manuf. 
small non-
manuf. 
medium/large 
non-manuf. 
BR (t-1) -0.546*** (0.100) 0.523*** (0.104) 0.241** (0.120) -0.579*** (0.097) -0.390*** (0.115) 
Bus. surv. indic. (t) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.000 (0.002) -0.004 (0.004) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.003 (0.002) 
Bus. surv. indic. (t-1) 0.002*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.004) 0.002*** (0.001) 0.003** (0.002) 
UNEMP (t) 0.013 (0.009) -0.027 (0.028) 0.007 (0.053) 0.016* (0.009) 0.033 (0.024) 
UNEMP (t-1) -0.004 (0.009) -0.035 (0.027) -0.004 (0.052) -0.002 (0.009) 0.013 (0.024) 
OLO (t) 0.019* (0.011) -0.018 (0.034) -0.045 (0.063) 0.020* (0.011) 0.002 (0.030) 
OLO (t-1) -0.001 (0.011) -0.043 (0.032) -0.023 (0.063) 0.001 (0.011) 0.015 (0.028) 
Constant -0.003 (0.004) 0.219*** (0.051) 0.244*** (0.043) -0.002 (0.004) -0.001 (0.009) 
Observations 74 74 74 74 74 
Adjusted R-squared 0.37 0.30 0.01 0.41 0.10 
Sample period: 1995Q1-2013Q4. All variables in first differences except the business survey indicator. *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% 
level. Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
4.2 The sensitivity of stress testing results 
As explained in Section 3.1, we express the results of our stress testing exercise for the different 
credit risk variables and for the different levels of aggregation in terms of expected losses and the 
impact on the banks' Tier 1 ratio. In particular, using information on LGD and EAD, the estimated 
changes in the credit risk variable can be converted into changes in expected losses on the basis 
of the formula EL=PD*LGD*EAD. Adding information on REA, the impact on Tier 1 capital can be 
calculated using equation (2) in Section 3.1. 
We make the following assumptions for the LGD, EAD and REA values. As for LGD, we assume a 
fixed value of 0.45 throughout the analysis. For both EAD and REA, we consider two possible 
values. First, we use the Belgian banks' total EAD (€1,001bn) and REA (€351bn) at the start of the 
stress test simulation period (2013Q4) and express our results in terms of impact on total Tier 1 
ratio.30 Since, bankruptcy rates only reflect the credit risk originating from loans to Belgian firms, 
unlike the NPL, LLP and FLLP ratios, which reflect the credit risk of all types of counterparties, we 
replicate the same calculations using data on Belgian banks’ corporate EAD (€271bn) and REA on 
the corporate portfolio (€142bn) in order to express our results in terms of impact on corporate Tier 
1 ratio. Table 5 shows the results of our exercise.  
 
4.2.1 The choice of credit risk variable 
Panel A of Table 5 reports the impact of our stress scenario on the banks' total Tier 1 capital ratio 
for the different credit risk variables. Using data on total EAD and REA, we find that the effect of the 
stress scenario decreases the banks' total Tier 1 ratio by an average of 0.56pp for the 50th 
percentile of the expected loss distribution and by 1.70pp on average when focusing on the 75th 
                                                   
30 Given that our credit risk variables only capture the credit risk of loans, we need to assume that the PD of 
loans and the PD of non-loan exposures (debt securities) are similar when multiplying our credit risk variables 
by the EAD. 
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 percentile. Especially in the case where the third quartile of the expected loss distribution is 
considered, there is substantial variation across the different credit risk variables, ranging from 
0.08pp when using the FLLP ratio to -2.93pp when using the LLP ratio as a credit risk variable. 
That is, despite the relatively high correlations across the different credit risk variables, using 
different variables in a stress testing exercise may lead to substantial differences in the stress 
testing results.  
The results for the FLLP ratio, which show a modest increase in banks’ total Tier 1 ratio at the 50th 
(0.28pp) and 75th (0.08pp) percentiles of the expected loss distribution, are interesting for two 
reasons at least. First, they demonstrate that a stress test exercise may lead to overoptimistic (and 
sometimes implausible) forecasts depending on the credit risk variable chosen, even though the 
results of the corresponding credit risk model were satisfactory and the macroeconomic scenario 
underpinning the stress test was judged severe enough.31 This precisely illustrates the type of 
model uncertainty (or risk) referred to in Section 3.1. Second, the results for the FLLP ratio show 
that the use of higher percentiles of the expected loss distribution can help to mitigate this 
uncertainty, the change in banks’ total Tier 1 ratio being lower and closer to zero at the 75th 
percentile than at the 50th percentile.     
The impacts on the banks' corporate Tier 1 ratio calculated on the basis of corporate EAD and REA 
are simply a rescaling of the impacts on the banks' total Tier 1 ratio. In particular, they amount to 
௖௢௥௣௢௥௔௧௘ா஺஽ ௖௢௥௣௢௥௔௧௘ோா஺Τ
௧௢௧௔௟ா஺஽ ௧௢௧௔௟ோா஺Τ
= 67.1% of the results based on total EAD and REAs. The reason for this 
is that, when considering only the corporate portfolio, REAs are relatively more important than EAD 
since corporates generally receive higher risk weights than the other counterparts in the total 
portfolio. Hence, the impact of the stress scenario on the banks' corporate Tier 1 ratio amounts to 
an average decrease of 0.38pp for the 50th percentile of the expected loss distribution and of 
1.14pp for the 75th percentile. The corresponding ranges of the impacts on the banks' corporate 
Tier 1 ratio, which are reduced by the same factor, amount to 1.03pp and 2.02pp at the 50th and 
the 75th percentiles respectively, which is still important, depending on the starting level of the 
banks' solvency position. 
Given the substantial variations that exist between the ranges of impacts observed at the 50th and 
the 75th percentiles of the expected loss distribution, the question arises as to whether one should 
consider the former or the latter threshold to gauge the importance of the choice of credit risk 
variable. There are two reasons supporting use of the upper quartile rather than the median of the 
simulated expected loss distribution. First, as explained above, the use of 75th percentile is helpful 
to mitigate model uncertainty. Second, the results of the 2014 EBA stress test, from which our 
stress testing application has borrowed the adverse macroeconomic scenario, showed that the 
weighted average impact of credit risk through P&L on Belgian banks’ total Tier 1 ratio amounted to 
-2.35pp in the adverse scenario. In other words, the average impact observed in a real-life stress 
test exercise was closer to the average impact reported in Panel A of Table 5 for the 75th 
percentile of the expected loss distribution (-1.70pp) than for the 50th percentile (-0.56pp).              
                                                   
31 In the case of the FLLP ratio, the increase in banks’ total Tier 1 ratio is due to the negative relationship 
found in the credit risk model between changes in this variable and changes in the OLO rate, the latter 
increasing strongly in the first year of the EBA adverse macroeconomic scenario (see Figure 3).  
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 4.2.2 The choice of level of data aggregation 
The impact of our stress scenario on the banks' Tier 1 capital ratio for the different levels of data 
aggregation is presented in Panel B of Table 5. In particular, we show the results for the stress test 
conducted at the economy-wide level, two intermediate levels (based on industrial sectors and firm 
size portfolios, respectively) and a disaggregate level (based on sector-size portfolio division) using 
BR as the credit risk variable. As these different levels of data aggregation are only analysed for 
the bankruptcy rate, we only calculate the impact of the stress scenario on banks' corporate Tier 1 
ratio.32   
We find that the effect of the stress scenario reduces the banks' corporate Tier 1 ratio by 1.38pp on 
average for the 50th percentile of the expected loss distribution and 2.54pp when focusing on the 
75th percentile. As for the different credit risk variables, we find substantial variation across the 
different levels of data aggregation of the expected loss distribution ranging, in the case of the third 
quartile, from -1.10pp when considering the economy-wide level to -3.86pp when working with the 
most disaggregate level.  
TABLE 5. The sensitivity of stress testing results. 
A. Impact on Tier 1 capital ratio of different credit risk variables 
 BR FLLP ratio LLP ratio NPL ratio Average Range 
 Total EAD and REA 
50th percentile -0.48pp 0.28pp -1.25pp -0.80pp -0.56pp 1.53pp 
75th percentile -1.64pp 0.08pp -2.93pp -2.31pp -1.70pp 3.01pp 
 Corporate EAD and REA 
50th percentile -0.33pp 0.19pp -0.84pp -0.54pp -0.38pp 1.03pp 
75th percentile -1.10pp 0.05pp -1.97pp -1.55pp -1.14pp 2.02pp 
B. Impact on Tier 1 capital ratio for different levels of data aggregation using BR as the credit risk 
variable 
 
Economy-
wide 
Industrial 
sector 
Firm size 
Sector and 
Size 
Average Range 
 Corporate EAD and REA 
50th percentile -0.33pp -2.63pp -0.31pp -2.26pp -1.38pp 2.32pp 
75th percentile -1.10pp -3.58pp -1.63pp -3.86pp -2.54pp 2.76pp 
 
 
4.3 Sensitivity checks 
The above stress testing results were obtained on the basis of the specification of the credit risk 
model with one lag for each independent variable. Since this was not always the preferred model 
specification, we report in Table 6 the maximum difference in the final impact on Tier 1 capital ratio 
across the different credit risk variables and different levels of data aggregation, respectively, for 
                                                   
32 The results based on total EAD and REAs could be obtained by dividing the results based on total EAD and 
REAs by 0.671. 
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 different numbers of lags of the independent variables included in the credit risk model. The figures 
in the first column in Table 6 coincide with those reported in the last column of Table 5.  
Panel A of Table 6 shows that for both the 50th and the 75th percentile of the expected loss 
distribution, there is always at least one alternative credit risk model for which the range of impacts 
on the Tier 1 ratio across the different credit risk variables increases compared to our base 
specification with one lag. In particular, the difference between the largest and the smallest impact 
on the total Tier 1 ratio across the different credit risk variables is highest when four lags are 
included in the credit risk model: 2.52pp at the 50th percentile and 3.83pp for the 75th percentile 
(1.69pp and 2.57pp when corporate EAD and REAs are considered). In other words, our finding of 
substantial variation in stress testing results when using different credit risk variables is even 
further strengthened when some of the alternative model specifications are used. The findings with 
respect to the levels of data aggregation in Panel B of Table 6 further confirm the result of the 
benchmark specification with 1 lag. 
TABLE 6. Sensitivity checks on the range of the impacts on Tier 1 capital ratio. 
 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 4 lags 
A. Range of impacts on Tier 1 capital ratio across different credit risk variables 
 Total EAD and REA 
50th percentile 1.53pp 1.51pp 1.80pp 2.52pp 
75th percentile 3.01pp 2.96pp 3.29pp 3.83pp 
 Corporate EAD and REA 
50th percentile 1.03pp 1.02pp 1.21pp 1.69pp 
75th percentile 2.02pp 1.99pp 2.21pp 2.57pp 
B. Range of impacts on Tier 1 capital ratio across different levels of data 
aggregation 
 Corporate EAD and REA 
50th percentile 2.32pp 2.49pp 2.53pp 2.65pp 
75th percentile 2.76pp 2.77pp 2.55pp 2.86pp 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has assessed the sensitivity of stress testing results to the choice of credit risk variable 
and level of data aggregation at which the stress test is conducted. Both choices are in fact often 
determined by practical considerations, such as data availability. Using data for the Belgian 
banking system, we find that the impact of a stress test on banks' total and corporate Tier 1 ratios 
can differ substantially depending on the credit risk variable and the level of data aggregation 
considered. 
While the economic relevance of these differences of course depends on the banks' initial solvency 
position, the implication of this analysis is that there is a need to better harmonise the way stress 
tests are conducted across institutions and supervisors in order to enhance comparability, 
especially if solvency stress tests are going to be used as a supervisory tool (e.g. for Pillar 2 
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 decisions via the SREP) or to set regulatory requirements (e.g. for systemically important banks). 
Given that there is no credit risk variable or level of data aggregation which dominates the others 
from a theoretical point of view, it appears more important to promote the consistent use of a given 
definition across banks and supervisors rather than to settle on a particular concept. This is 
certainly relevant in the context of the EU-wide stress tests, where institutions often use different 
credit risk variables and levels of data aggregation to estimate the impact of the commonly agreed 
stress test methodology and macroeconomic scenario on their capital while supervisory authorities 
rely on their own in-house models to quality assure and validate banks’ projections. More generally, 
our results also highlight the need to improve the availability and quality of the data to be used for 
stress testing purposes. 
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Appendix 
 
 
TABLE A1. Description of variables used in the credit risk model. 
  
Variable Definition  
  
  
NPL ratio Stock of non-performing loans / Total loans (%) 
LLP ratio Stock of impairments / Total loans (%) 
FLLP ratio Flow of new impairments (net of reversal) / Total loans (%) 
BR Bankruptcy rate = number of filings for liquidation type bankruptcy / 
number of companies in existence at end of previous quarter (%)    
Business survey indicator  National Bank of Belgium’s overall business survey indicator (points) 
UNEMP Unemployment rate (%) 
OLO 10-year interest rate on Belgium government bonds (OLO rate) (%)  
    
30
 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 338 – MARCH 2018 31 
 
NATIONAL BANK OF BELGIUM - WORKING PAPERS SERIES 
 
The Working Papers are available on the website of the Bank: http://www.nbb.be. 
 
290. “Predicting Belgium’s GDP using targeted bridge models”, by Ch. Piette, Research series, January 2016. 
291. “Did export promotion help firms weather the crisis?”, by J. Van Biesebroeck, J. Konings and C. Volpe 
Martincus, Research series, January 2016. 
292. “On the role of public policies and wage formation for business investment in R&D: A long-run panel 
analysis”, by T. Buyse, F. Heylen and R. Schoonackers, Research series, January 2016. 
293. “Unraveling firms: Demand, productivity and markups heterogeneity”, by E. Forlani, R. Martin, G. Mion 
and M. Muûls, Research series, February 2016. 
294. “Unemployment risk and over-indebtedness: A micro-econometric perspective”, by Ph. Du Caju, F. Rycx
and I. Tojerow, Research series, February 2016. 
295. “International shocks and domestic prices: How large are strategic complementarities?”, by A. Amiti, 
O. Itskhoki and J. Konings, Research series, March 2016. 
296. “The supplier network of exporters: Connecting the dots”, by E. Dhyne and S. Rubínová, Research 
series, May 2016. 
297. “Does one size fit all at all times? The role of country specificities and state dependencies in predicting 
banking crises” by S. Ferrari and M. Pirovano, Research series, May 2016. 
298. “Competition and product mix adjustment of multi-product exporters: Evidence from Belgium”, by 
K. Breemersch, Research series, June 2016. 
299. “Flemish maritime ports, Liège port complex and the port of Brussels – Report 2014”, by G. Van Gastel, 
Document series, June 2016. 
300. “Misalignment of productivity and wages across regions? Evidence from Belgian matched panel data”, by 
F. Rycx, Y. Saks and I. Tojerow, Research series, July 2016. 
301. “The European Payments Union and the origins of Triffin’s regional approach towards international 
monetary integration”, by I. Maes and I. Pasotti, Research series, September 2016. 
302. “The transmission mechanism of credit support policies in the Euro Area”, by J. Boeckx, M. de Sola 
Perea and G. Peersman, Research series, October 2016. 
303. “Bank capital (requirements) and credit supply: Evidence from pillar 2 decisions”, by O. De Jonghe, 
H. Dewachter and S. Ongena, Research series, October 2016. 
304. “Monetary and macroprudential policy games in a monetary union”, by R. Dennis and P. Ilbas, Research 
series, October 2016. 
305. “Forward guidance, quantitative easing, or both?, by F. De Graeve and K. Theodoridis, Research series, 
October 2016. 
306. “The impact of sectoral macroprudential capital requirements on mortgage loan pricing: Evidence from 
the Belgian risk weight add-on”, by S. Ferrari, M. Pirovano and P. Rovira Kaltwasser, Research series, 
October 2016. 
307. “Assessing the role of interbank network structure in business and financial cycle analysis”, by 
J-Y Gnabo and N.K. Scholtes, Research series, October 2016. 
308. “The trade-off between monetary policy and bank stability”, by M. Lamers, F. Mergaerts, E. Meuleman 
and R. Vander Vennet, Research series, October 2016. 
309. “The response of euro area sovereign spreads to the ECB unconventional monetary policies”, by 
H. Dewachter, L. Iania and J-C. Wijnandts, Research series, October 2016. 
310. “The interdependence of monetary and macroprudential policy under the zero lower bound”, by V. Lewis 
and S. Villa, Research series, October 2016. 
311. “The impact of exporting on SME capital structure and debt maturity choices”, by E. Maes, 
N. Dewaelheynes, C. Fuss and C. Van Hulle, Research series, October 2016. 
312. “Heterogeneous firms and the micro origins of aggregate fluctuations”, by G. Magerman, K. De Bruyne, 
E. Dhyne and J. Van Hove, Research series, October 2016. 
313. “A dynamic factor model for forecasting house prices in Belgium”, by M. Emiris, Research series, 
November 2016. 
314. “La Belgique et l’Europe dans la tourmente monétaire des années 1970 – Entretiens avec Jacques van 
Ypersele”, by I. Maes and S. Péters, Research series, December 2016. 
315. “Creating associations to substitute banks’ direct credit. Evidence from Belgium”, by M. Bedayo, 
Research series, December 2016. 
316. “The impact of export promotion on export market entry”, by A. Schminke and J. Van Biesebroeck, 
Research series, December 2016. 
317. “An estimated two-country EA-US model with limited exchange rate pass-through”, by G. de Walque, 
Ph. Jeanfils, T. Lejeune, Y. Rychalovska and R. Wouters, Research series, March 2017. 
 32       NBB WORKING PAPER No. 338 – MARCH 2018 
318. Using bank loans as collateral in Europe: The role of liquidity and funding purposes”, by F. Koulischer 
and P. Van Roy, Research series, April 2017. 
319. “The impact of service and goods offshoring on employment: Firm-level evidence”, by C. Ornaghi, 
I. Van Beveren and S. Vanormelingen, Research series, May 2017. 
320. “On the estimation of panel fiscal reaction functions: Heterogeneity or fiscal fatigue?”, by G. Everaert and 
S. Jansen, Research series, June 2017. 
321. “Economic importance of the Belgian ports: Flemish maritime ports, Liège port complex and the port of 
Brussels - Report 2015”, by C. Mathys, Document series, June 2017. 
322. “Foreign banks as shock absorbers in the financial crisis?”, by G. Barboni, Research series, June 2017. 
323. “The IMF and precautionary lending: An empirical evaluation of the selectivity and effectiveness of the 
flexible credit line”, by D. Essers and S. Ide, Research series, June 2017. 
324. “Economic importance of air transport and airport activities in Belgium – Report 2015”, by S. Vennix, 
Document series, July 2017. 
325. “Economic importance of the logistics sector in Belgium”, by H. De Doncker, Document series, 
July 2017. 
326. “Identifying the provisioning policies of Belgian banks”, by E. Arbak, Research series, July 2017. 
327. “The impact of the mortgage interest and capital deduction scheme on the Belgian mortgage market”, by 
A. Hoebeeck and K. Inghelbrecht, Research series, September 2017. 
328. “Firm heterogeneity and aggregate business services exports: Micro evidence from Belgium, France, 
Germany and Spain”, by A. Ariu, E. Biewen, S. Blank, G. Gaulier, M.J. González, Ph. Meinen, D. Mirza, 
C. Martín and P. Tello, Research series, September 2017. 
329. “The interconnections between services and goods trade at the firm-level”, by  A. Ariu, H. Breinlichz, 
G. Corcosx, G. Mion, Research series, October 2017. 
330. “Why do manufacturing firms produce services? Evidence for the servitization paradox in Belgium”, by 
P. Blanchard, C. Fuss and C. Mathieu, Research series, November 2017. 
331. “Nowcasting real economic activity in the euro area: Assessing the impact of qualitative surveys”, by 
R. Basselier, D. de Antonio Liedo and G. Langenus, Research series, December 2017. 
332. “Pockets of risk in the Belgian mortgage market: Evidence from the Household Finance and 
Consumption Survey (HFCS)”, by Ph. Du Caju, Research series, December 2017. 
333. “The employment consequences of SMEs’ credit constraints in the wake of the great recession” by 
D. Cornille, F. Rycx and I. Tojerow, Research series, December 2017. 
334. “Exchange rate movements, firm-level exports and heterogeneity”, by A. Berthou and E. Dhyne, 
Research series, January 2018. 
335 “Nonparametric identification of unobserved technological heterogeneity in production”, by L. Cherchye, 
T. Demuynck, B. De Rock and M. Verschelde, Research series, February 2018. 
336 “Compositional changes in aggregate productivity in an era of globalisation and financial crisis”, by 
C. Fuss and A. Theodorakopoulos, Research series, February 2018. 
337. “Decomposing firm-product appeal: How important is consumer taste?”, by B. Y. Aw, Y. Lee and 
H. Vandenbussche, Research series, March 2018. 
338 “Sensitivity of credit risk stress test results: Modelling issues with an application to Belgium”, by 
P. Van Roy, S. Ferrari and C. Vespro, Research series, March 2018. 
 
© Illustrations :  National Bank of Belgium
Layout : Analysis and Research Group 
Cover : NBB AG – Prepress & Image
Published in March 2018
Editor
Jan Smets
Governor of the National Bank of Belgium
National Bank of Belgium 
Limited liability company 
RLP Brussels – Company’s number : 0203.201.340 
Registered office : boulevard de Berlaimont 14 – BE -1000 Brussels 
www.nbb.be
